I'm intrigued by the mentioned attempts to legally declare "this is science; that is not science." Where my thoughts are coming from [yeah reading with a pen!]:


"Facts ... are theory laden" (Ronell 27)

"Despite its intuitive plausibility, the idea of testability, he offers, 'can never be developed into an adequate criterion for distinguishing between science and psuedo-science.' Thus Hempel introduces the notion of 'under-inclusiveness,' which is used in order to show that no singular statement can be entirely falsified. The falsifiability criterion shares the same features and hence the same problems as those of the verfiability criterion. 'The negation of any singular or existential statement (eg 'there is at least one unicorn') is a universal statement ('there are no unicorns'). No matter how many conforming observations are made of this universal statement, non-conforming events remain logically possible.' The falsifiability criterion is under-inclusive because 'it excludes all singular statements from the class of empirically meaningful or scientific statements.' " (Ronell, 29-30)

"The sentences that are supposed to serve as the test are themselves in need of testing." (Ronell, 30)


Facts are theory laden. How awesome is that? It so succinctly summarizes (I caught the alliteration bug from Jon apparently) both our modern state of court clog, as well as the philosophy of science. But my words are detracting from its beautiful brevity...

Is the falsification standard that a test must reliably produce possitive falses? The benefit being, it seems, a greater avoidance of false-falses [DNA evidence being incorrectly wrong], which is in the spirit of "innocence until..." But, the problem arrises that to negate the proposition ∃x=unicorn (there exists an x that is a unicorn) is to say ∀x(¬∃x=unicorn) (for all x, there does not exist an x that is a unicorn). Its that "for all x" part that makes the falsifiability standard under-inclusive. But is the search for unicorns not the very nature of science?

"The sentences ..." I'm troubled. This seems like it would make a nice transition to Derrida... on that note, I'll finish this section later.