The State and The State of Things...

One of these arches is not like the others...

Nomad science leaves its mark on the State. The State of the catholic church, haunted by the war machine that was the masonry workers.

The trouble I that it's always difficult to distinguish between connections and lines of flight. Keep it simple stupid. Right.

I'm not really a fan of State run war. I'm really not a fan of THIS State run war. A light of flight (I recognize this one) related to URL's is drawn, but we wont follow that right now. In general, I don't like militaristic metaphors. All that death, violence, and mutilation. But, there is a difference in the war machine and State run war.

Simultaneously, I do understand that when you're going to pick a fight, shit's bound to hit the fan. Especially when the war machine starts rumbling around and the State isn't the one doing the running. The men and women of war know the difference. Tell me there isn't a difference.

The lines of our bodies are drawn with a war machine. We cannot help but be constituted in the fire of mutilation and dismemberment. That's what it's all about right? At least if we're going to keep things interesting, we're going to need to nip and tuck a bit. The war machine constitutes our BwO. That doesn't mean I have to desire war, but I must desire something other than the State of things. Isn't that how it is for all of us when we desire. This, not that. Not the State of things.

I desire... My BwO is constituted...

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"Axiom I. The war machine is exterior to the State apparatus." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, Pp. 351)

"Chess is a game of State; or of the court: the emperor of China played it. Chess pieces are coded; they have an internal nature and intrinsic properties from which their movements, situations, and confrontations derive." (Pp. 352)

"Go pieces, in contrast, are pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, and have only an anonymous, collective, or third-person function: 'it' makes a move. 'It' could be a man, a woman, a louse, an elephant. Go pieces are elements of a nonsubjectified machine assemblage with no intrinsic properties, only situational ones." (Pp. 352-353)

"Chess is indeed a war, but an institutionalized, regulated, coded war, with a front, a rear, battles. But what is proper to Go is war without battle lines, with neither confrontation nor retreat, without battles even: pure strategy, whereas chess is a semiology. Finally, the space is not at all the same: in chess, it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself, thus of going from one point to another, of occupying the maximum number of squares within the minimum number of pieces. In Go, it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival. The 'smooth' space of Go, as against the 'striated' space of chess. The nomos of Go against the State of chess, nomos against polis. The difference is that chess codes and decodes space, whereas Go proceeds altogether differently, territorializing or deterritorializing it (make the outside a territory in space; consolidate that territory by the construction of a second, adjacent territory; deterritorialize the enemy by shattering his territory from within; deterritorialize oneself by renouncing, by going elsewhere...)." (Pp. 353)

"Warding off the formation of a State apparatus, making such a formation impossible, would be the objective of a certain number of primitive [Remember Lévy-Strauss, We are multiple.] social mechanisms, even if they are not consciously understood as such. To be sure, primitive societies have chiefs. But the State is not defined by the existence of chiefs; it is defined by the perpetuation or conservation of organs of power. The concern of the State is to conserve." (Pp. 357)

"The chief is more like a leader or a star than a man of power and is always in danger of being disavowed, abandoned by his people. But Clastres goes further, identifying war in primitive societies as the surest mechanism directed against the formation of the State: war maintains the dispersal and segmentarity of groups, and the warrior himself is caught in a process of accumulating exploits leading him to solitude and a prestigious but powerless death. Clastres can thus invoke natural Law while reversing its principle proposition: just as Hobbes saw clearly that the State was against war, so war is against the State, and makes it impossible. It should not be concluded that war is a state of nature, but rather that it is the mode of a social state that wards off and prevents the State. Primitive war does not produce the State any more than it derives from it." (Pp. 357)

"Packs, bands, are groups of the rhizome type, as opposed to the arborescent type that centers around organs of power. That is why bands in general, even those engaged in banditry or high-society life, are metamorphoses of a war machine formally distinct from all State apparatuses or their equivalents, which are instead what structure centralized societies. We certainly would not say that discipline is what defines a war machine: discipline is the characteristic required of armies after the State has appropriated them. The war machine answers to other rules. We are not saying that they are better of course, only that they animate a fundamental indiscipline of the warrior, a questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail by abandonment or betrayal, and a very volatile sense of honor, all of which, once again impedes the formation of the State." (Pp. 358)

"And most important, it becomes impossible to understand the relations between science and technology, science and practice, because nomad science is not a simple technology or practice, but a scientific field in which the problem of those relations is brought out and resolved in an entirely different way from the point of view of royal science." (Pp. 367)

"But this is not the case: following is not at all the same thing as reproducing, and one never follows in order to reproduce. The idea of reproduction, deduction, or induction is part of royal science, at all times and in all places, and treats differences of time and place as so many variables, the constant form of which extracted precisely by the law; for the same phenomena to recur in a gravitational and striated space it is sufficient for the same conditions to obtain, or for the same constant relation to hold between the differing conditions and the variable phenomena. Reproducing implies the permanence of a fixed point of view that is external to what is reproduced: watching the flow from the bank. But following is something different from the ideal of reproduction. Not better, just different." (Pp. 372)

"As Virillio says, war in no way appears when man applies to man the relation of the hunter to the animal, but on the contrary when he captures the force of the hunted animal and enters an entirely new relation to man, that of war (enemy, no longer prey)." (Pp. 398)

"But an equilibrium of forces is a phenomenon of resistance, whereas the counterattack implies a rush or change of speed that breaks the equilibrium: it was the tank that regrouped all of the operations in the speed vector and recreated a smooth space for movement by uprooting men and arms." (Pp. 397)

"It is always the assemblage that constitutes the weapons system. The lance and the sword came into being in the Bronze Age only by virtue of the man-horse assemblage, which cause a lengthening of the dagger and pike, and made the first infantry weapons, the morning star and the battle-ax, obsolete." (Pp. 399)

"Assemblages are passional, they are compositions of desire. Desire has nothing to do with a natural or spontaneous determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled desire." (Pp. 399)

"The violence of the jurist-king: his way of beginning over again every move, always with attention to ends, alliances, and laws...All things considered, the violence of the war machine might appear softer and more supple than that of the State apparatus because it does not yet have war as its 'object,' because it eludes both poles of the State. That is why the man of war, in his exteriority, is always protesting the alliances and pacts of the jurist-king, as well as severing the bonds of the magic emperor. He is equally an unbider and a betrayer: twice the traitor. He has another economy, another cruelty, but also another justice, another pity. To the signs and tools of the State, the man of war opposes his weapons and jewelry. Once again, who could say which is better and which is worse? It is true that war kills, and hideously mutilates. But it is especially true after the State has appropriated the war machine. Above all, the State apparatus makes the mutilation, and even death, come first. ... Mutilation is a consequence of war, but it is a necessary condition, a presupposition of the State apparatus and the organization of work. " (Pp. 425)

"How do you make yourself a body without organs? At any rate, you have one (or several). It's not so much that it preexists or comes ready-made, although in certain respects it is preexistent. At any rate, you make one, you can't desire without making one. Ant it awaits you; it is an inevitable exercies or experimentation, already accomplished the moment you undertake it, unaccomplished as long as you don't. This not reassuring, because you can botch it. Or it can be terrifying, and lead you to your death. It is nondesire as well as desire. It is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of practices. You never reach the Body without Organs, you can't reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit." (Pp. 149)

"For each type of BwO, we must ask: (1) What type is it, how is it fabricated, by what procedures and means (predetermining what will come to pass)? (2) What are its modes, what comes to pass, and with what variants and what surprises, what is unexpected and what expected?" (Pp. 152)

"Every time desire is betrayed, cursed, uprooted from its field of immanence, a priest is behind it. The priest cast the triple curse on desire: the negative law, the extrinsic rule, and the transcendent ideal. Facing north, the priest said, Desire is lack (how could it not lack what it desires?). The priest carried out the first sacrifice, named him castration, and all the men and women of the north lined up behind him, crying in cadence, 'Lack, lack, it's the common law.' Then, facing south, the priest linked desire to pleasure. For there are hedonistic, even orgiastic priests. Desire will be assuaged by pleasure; and not only will the pleasure obtained silence desire for a moment but the process of obtaining it is already a way of interrupting it, of instantly discharging it and unburdening oneself of it. Pleasure as discharge: the priest carries out the second sacrifice, named masturbation. Then facing east, he exclaimed: Jouissance is impossible, bu impossible jouissance is inscribed in desire. For that, in its very impossibility, is the Ideal, the 'manque-à-jouir that is life.' The priest carried out the third sacrifice, phantasy or the thousand and one nights, the one hundred twenty days, while the men of the East changed: Yes, we will be your phantasy, your ideal and impossibility, yours and also our own. The priest did not turn to the west. He knew that in the west lay a plane of consistency, but he thought that ways was blocked by the columns of Hercules, that it led nowhere and was uninhabited by people. But that is where desire was lurking, west was the shortest route east, as well as to the other directions, rediscovered or deterritorialized." (Pp. 154)

"We come to the gradual realization that the BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs called the organism." (Pp. 158)

"Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor. Actually, dismantling the organism is no more difficult than dismantling the other two strata, signifiance and subjectification. Signifiance clings to the soul just as the organism clings to the body, and it is not easy to get rid of either. And how can we unhook ourselves from the points of subjectification that secure us, nail us down to a dominant reality? Tearing the conscious away from the subject in order to make it a means of exploration, tearing the unconscious away from signifiance and interpretation in order to make it a veritable production: this is assuredly no more or less difficult than tearing the body away from the organism. Caution is the art common to all three; if in dismantling the organism there are times one courts death, in slipping away from signifiance and subjection one courts falsehood, illusion and hallucination and psychic death." (Pp. 160)